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RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE
POMAKS IN GREECE AND BULGARIA: BEHIND THE STATE
VALANCE
By Stefan Ubiparipović

Stefan Ubiparipović is a student in the Interdisciplinary Master’s Program in South-Eastern European
Studies in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Belgrade, Serbia and Karl Franzens
University in Graz, Austria.

Introduction
The political, social and religious diversity and undulating environment of the SouthEastern European region has served as a cradle for many different identities. Depiction of
historical legacies, political changes, and state policies has led to the continuous shaping of
Muslim identities. This paper will focus on the Pomak1 community within two states, Greece and
Bulgaria. During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, in the period after the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire, Pomaks have experienced challenges which bore a direct influence on their
identity. Both of the abovementioned countries had a specific approach towards minorities,
which left noticeable consequences.
First, I will briefly explain the important events that have coincided or strongly
influenced Pomak identity during the twentieth century. Several Greek and Bulgarian state
policies will be mentioned for they served as fierce attempts to essentially change Pomaks. This

1

Pomaks are non-Turkic and non-Albanian Slavic Muslim communities in south-eastern Balkans.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2017) XXXVII, 3

72

segment here will focus on the events that occurred between the end of World War I and shortly
before the fall of the Soviet Union.
Next, this paper will focus on the period after the fall of communism in Europe and
attempt to address the current state policies towards Pomaks. Bulgaria and Greece, as major
Orthodox Christian countries, have distinct solutions for cooperating with minorities which
reflect the strong or weak influence of Islam.
Finally, I will conclude this paper by showing that the Muslim religious identity is to
some extent relative and may individually and directly depends on the strict or loose state
policies addressing minorities. Furthermore, the persistent role the state plays here has led to an
uncertainty regarding clear Pomak identity. After all, it seems that the state has been successful
in influencing Pomaks, resulting in this minority being completely different in these two
countries, where they face contrasting existential and structural problems.

Between Athens and Sofia
Pomaks represent a Muslim minority which can be found in several states in the SouthEastern Europe region. This paper will focus on their position in Bulgaria and Greece. In
Bulgaria, Pomaks are mainly residing in the central parts of the Rhodope Mountains, while in
Greece, they are located in the north and northeastern parts, mainly in Western Thrace. In both
cases, they live near the border between these two countries. It is believed that there are
approximately 50,0002 Pomaks in Greece and somewhere between 67,000 to 250,000 Pomaks in
Bulgaria.3 The last national census in Bulgaria took place in 2011, and it showed that ten percent
of its population are Muslims, which is approximately 500,000 people, and in which the “persons

2
3

C. Skutsch, Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities, (Routledge, 2013), 974.
Ibid.
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who determine themselves as belonging to the Bulgarian ethnic group [… there are] 67,350
Muslims.”4 The Muslim community represents a significant part of the population in Bulgaria,
especially in the south and southeastern parts, while in Greece, it accounts for approximately 1.3
percent of the population, which is around 100,000 people.5
In the years following the end of World War I and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923,
Greece and Turkey agreed to have a population exchange treaty, but Pomaks and Roma were
exempted from it. It is believed that Pomaks had hindrances as seen in their historical legacy and
geographical positioning, and included the impact of the Cold War and the weight of religion and
language.
First, in Greece, the state politics after World War I led to more ethnic purity. Removing
all signs of the Ottomans meant pursuing a policy which would ostracize the Muslim population,
but Pomaks and Roma people remained a special group. Their position and attitude by the state
was a bit derogatory. During the years of the Lausanne Treaty, “most Pomaks in 1920s lived in
mountainous areas”6 and afterwards their settlements included a “multiculturalism based on the
Ottoman millet understanding of ‘community’, where religious divisions marked out group
boundaries.”7
Next, it is very important to mention that the period during the Cold War was essential in
shaping identities of the group in both countries. The border between these two countries was the
eastern part of the Iron Curtain, therefore causing Pomaks to be portrayed by both sides as
potential traitors. In Greece, they were seen as natural collaborators with communists because
4

Bulgarian National Statistical Institute (2011), “National Census 2011”, Republic of Bulgaria, p. 27; Available at:
http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf. [accessed on March 9, 2017].
5
The World Factbook (2017), “Greece: People and Society”, Central Intelligence Agency; Available at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gr.html.
6
Olga Demetriou, “Prioritizing ‘ethnicities’: The uncertainty of Pomak-ness in the urban Greek Rhodope,” Ethnic
and Racial Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2004): 100.
7
Ibid., 4.
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they spoke Bulgarian. As a result, the settlements were isolated from the public and required
special travel documents which served as a carefully designed concentrated procedure to prevent
a possible communist insurgency.8
In Bulgaria, the Communist Party proclaimed unity among citizens, women and men,
which played a crucial role in internal relations. Nonetheless, Bulgarian nationalist policies
initiated “several campaigns by Bulgarian governments to assimilate Pomaks into the Bulgarian
majority through coercive tactics […] to develop multiple identities” where “most of these are
contested by other Pomaks, by their Bulgarian and Turkish neighbours, by nationalist
organizations, and by state authorities.”9 Bulgarian state nationalism considered Pomaks ethnic
Bulgarians because of their Slavic speech which then promoted the discourses that they were
violently converted to Islam by the Ottomans.10 This led to the “Once a Bulgarian, always a
Bulgarian” campaign, which meant that “at times the Pomaks have been allowed to maintain
their religious identity unhindered, while at other times authorities have attempted to assimilate
them into the majority Bulgarian culture by forcing them to replace their Muslim names with
Bulgarian names, renounce their Islamic faith and convert to Christianity,” which happened
“[f]our times during the twentieth century (1912, 1942, 1962, and 1971-74).”11 Consequently,
living on the border further influenced state policies in order to prevent migrations from the
Soviet sphere to Greece and/or Turkey. The situation was not so different considering this: “the

8

There was even a wall built between two countries which served the purpose of maintaining the Iron Curtain
strong. Hugh Poulton & Taji-Farouki Suha, Muslim Identity and the Balkan State, (Washington Square, NY: New
York University Press, 1997), 49.
9
A. Eminov, “Social Construction of Identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria”, European Centre for Minority Issues, (2007):
19.
10
Bulgarians thought that Pomak “origins were always accompanied by lamentations for their alleged violent
conversion to Islam (during the Ottoman rule over the Balkans).” E Karagiannis “The Pomaks in Bulgaria and
Greece: Comparative Remarks,” University of Zurich, Euxeinos, Vol. 8 (2012): 20.
11
Ibid., 10.
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political freedom from the state pressure of reprisals, is occupied by other political figures, who
are no less ambitious.”12
Finally, speaking Bulgarian and being a Muslim did not improve their position or pave
way to less assertive policies in identity-shaping. Also, assimilation of the minority in order to
achieve a “clean” ethnic image was impossible because “the Pomaks do not share the same
historical myths with the Bulgarian [or Greek] majority […] and their culture is Islamic.”13
Pomaks remained torn between Turkish, Bulgarian, and other ethnic elements and “[s]tanding at
the crossroads of language, ethnicity and religion, the identification [… of] minority has been
highly controversial.”14

From an Iron to an Invisible Curtain for the Pomaks
There are several important factors Bulgarian Pomaks have that influenced and
comprehensively changed their contemporary lives, and helped coax the alteration of behavior
within the group. These specific intertwining moments are the direct consequences of the
capitalist system, fall of communism, EU integration, and the influence of foreign countries.
First, after the fall of communism, the economic situation drastically changed for the
group, where many large state enterprises were privatized and then dismantled. Men and women
had more equal positions before so this led to the bartered “patriarchal environment where men

12

M. Benovska-Sabkova “In search of one’s own self: Identity of the Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) – A case study
from the Western Rhodopes,” Interculturalism and Discrimination in Romania, Transactions Publishers, (2006):
195.
13
G. Lozanova, A. Bozhidar, G. Nazarska, E. Troeva-Gligorova & I. Kyurkchieva. “Regions, Minorities and
European Policies: A State of the Art Report on Muslim Minorities (Turks and Pomaks) in Central South Planning
Region (Bulgaria),” International Centre for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (IMIR), (2003), 25.
14
A. Boboc-Cojocaru. “The ‘Other Within’ in the Balkans – The Case of Pomaks”, International Scientific
Conference: Literature, Discourse and Multicultural Dialogue, University of Petru Maior, ALPHA, (2013): 334.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MAY 2017) XXXVII, 3

76

were dominant, now women earned money.”15 Moreover, the local community was devastated
by the fact that “Bulgaria was suddenly thrust into the global capitalist economy […] and a fatal
combination of labor unrest, international market pressure, bungled privatization, and high-level
corruption” took place.16 Furthemore, it was evident that the unemployment rates were “higher
among minorities and Pomaks.”17
Secondly, the EU integration process was announced as a positive incentive for the
Muslim minority but in practice, this was not noticeable particularly in rural areas in the
perplexed state-minority relations. The Bulgarian Constitution of 1990 did prescribe that every
citizen was equal and gave certain minority and religious freedoms. The process of accession and
membership to the EU did bring improvements and countered the buttressed edifice of inveterate
state decisions towards the community. On the other side, it brought limited opportunities,
particularly economic ones, and more chances to migrate to other countries which led to a
smaller and dispersed Pomak community. Here, it was clear that “in the areas on both sides along
Bulgarian-Greek border […] the idea of European identity started to be viewed as an alternative
to the deadlock in the identity of the community.”18
Lastly, the strong religious influence of foreign countries was a natural successor backed
up by the embitterment caused by state engagement during the Cold War. Pomaks in Bulgaria
leaned more against religion, preferring a more conservative, artificially imported Islamic
dogma. In some cities, it was noticeable that “restaurants had stopped serving pork […] some
women were no longer allowed to leave their homes without their husbands’ permission—
something unheard of before 1989 […] men who went to the mosque were being given
15

Kristen Ghodsee, Muslim Lives in Eastern Europe: Gender, Ethnicity, & the Transformation of Islam in
Postsocialist Bulgaria. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 26.
16
Ibid., 8.
17
Poulton & Taji-Farouki, op. cit., 45.
18
G. Lozanova et al., op.cit., 25.
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preference for local jobs and old people were now being chastised as “bad” Muslims for carrying
on local traditions.”19 Another more visible sign of the influence was that “an increasing number
of young women were dressing head to toe in a new Islamic style imported from abroad.”20
Perspicuous endeavors of religious diplomacy and education led to the understanding that
“European Muslim communities share common geopolitical circumstances, such as the ubiquity
of globalization, the financial dominance of Saudi Arabia over the international Islamic
charitable aid establishment.”21 The influence of religious dogma had direct socio-economic
benefits for the community by bringing more conservative Islam as well as employment,
education, and infrastructure. Furthermore, it built new mosques, brought young imams who
were motivated to revive the settlements, while on the other side, the state missed their chance to
widely support such activities.
In Greece, we could identify the leading issues clouting the Pomaks, namely the minority
state policies and on the other side, the education system and seriousness of the religious
dogmas.
First, Greek state policies are noticeably not defining the Pomak identity as unique, but
rather a part of the Muslim community. On the other side, the biggest Muslim minority is
Turkish, so presumably due to efficient and more adequate control towards the group, the
authorities are intentionally not clear in separating the two groups. Encroachment towards this
strategy could be depicted as “[t]he bureaucratic Turkization of the Greek Pomaks [which]
coincided with the [previous] anticommunist imperatives of Greek policy.”22 In this way, the
“Greek government constructed a double-faced imaginary identity for the Slavic speaking

19

Ghodsee, op. cit., 1.
Ibid.
21
Ibid., 5.
22
Karagiannis , op. cit., 21.
20
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Muslim populations”23 and succeeded in constantly throwing their minds back and forth to
Turkish identity.24
Secondly, minority schools in Western Thrace teach in Turkish language with a lot
emphasis on “modernization.” This is explained as practically attempting to shake and refresh
the Muslim conservative religious dogmas, where in some cases teachers “are very proud when
girls come with scarfs and take it off by the end of school.”25 Feasibility of educational policies26
also shows the influence of younger generations who in some cases, might consider the term
Pomak as derogatory and outdated. Notwithstanding, Greek “state politics are revealed as neither
a singular nor an unidirectional top-down process”27 and it is important to mention that the
community is very suspicious towards authorities, where decades of isolation during the Cold
War left a genuine mark.
At the end, Pomaks are left with multiple identities and their main flagship characteristics
are their language and religion which proudly stand out today.28 State predilection and
sometimes strenuous actions have contributed to the “lack of consent on Pomak identity”29 but
they “cannot be considered as migrants or foreigners.”30 By the same token, the identity

23

P. G. Papadimitriou “(Trans)forming Group Identities Among the Rhodopes’ Pomaks in the First Decades of the
20th Century: A Historical Perspective”, Institute for Balkan Studies, Biannual Publication, (2010): 229.
24
Besides, two countries have “developed different strategies to deal with the minority; While Bulgaria’s policy
aimed at both the cultural assimilation into the Bulgarian nation and the socio-structural integration into the
Bulgarian society, Greek policy resulted in the assimilation of the Pomaks into the Turkish minority of Greece”. See
Karagiannis, op.cit.,19.
25
Demetriou, op., cit., 108.
26
One of the intentions is to try “to persuade them to abandon the language, customs, habits and even their national
self-definition, by attributing their suspicion to these elements. In this way their folklore is confronted as a species
for rejection and change, since it is squeezed among their national consciousness and their religious identity”. Read
more in M. G. Varvounis. “Historical and Ethnological Influences on the Traditional Civilization of Pomaks of the
Greek Thrace”, (Komotinie, Greece: Demokritus University of Thrace, Department of History and Ethnology,
2003), 11.
27
Ibid., 114.
28
This creates a situation where “members of a given community have multiple identities, each activated upon
appropriate circumstances”. Eminov, op. cit., 1.
29
Demetriou, op.,cit., 103.
30
Samim Akgönül, “Is there a Muslim Minority in Europe”, Akademie der Diözese Rottenburg-Stuttgart, (2013), 2.
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misunderstanding is developed substantially as “the hybridity and fluidity of Pomak identity […
where some] make the claim that the Turks should not represent them politically.”31 It could be
seen that Pomaks had no other options than to develop a “clandestine identity [which] adopts and
employs itself for the sake of its inner stability forms of social organizations borrowed from or
even enforced from the majority administration.”32 State actions and policies, together with their
previous acts during the Cold War, have significantly marked this identity and “proved to be
decisive formative factors of the identity.”33 This leads to the conclusion that “Pomak
identity(ies) will show that claims to a particular identity are not primordial or a fixed essence”34
or “an unstable state of a communal identity.”35 Certainly in Bulgaria at least, “the fact that the
state policy was different towards Turks and towards Pomaks played an important role.”36
Furthermore, minorities faced confusion “[w]hile private Pomak identity enabled them to enjoy
their local affiliation and sustain an inclusion and exclusion system, the Turkish identity enabled
them to negotiate their survival through the inconsistent and threatening minority policies.”37

Conclusion
Pomaks, similar to many minorities in the South-Eastern European region, had a
burdensome recent history marked by several state interventions. During the twentieth century,
particularly the period of the Cold War, both Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria situated on the
borders, faced challenges and were considered a potential political threat to the state.

31

Ghodsee, op. cit., 22.
Poulton & Taji-Farouki, op. cit., 52.
33
Karagiannis, op. cit., 23.
34
Eminov, op. cit., 2.
35
Yulian Konstantinov, “Minority Name Studies in the Balkans – the Pomaks”, Citation Information: Folia
Linguistica. Vol. 26, Issue 3-4, (1992): 403.
36
Lozanova et al., op. cit., 30.
37
Boboc-Cojocaru, op. cit., 344.
32
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Policies aimed to create a homogenous ethnic image such as Christianization, change of
names in Bulgaria, and the restriction of movement and isolation in Greece created a gap in
Pomak-state relations. After 1990, this situation changed but their legacy of previous attempts to
create this image still remains strong,lamenting in memory today. In Bulgaria, overextended use
of force by the state was replaced by almost no socio-economic actions which gave space for
third parties to promote a more conservative Islamic dogma. In Greece, education plays an
important role in unfastening the Pomak identity, where the minority is pushed towards being a
part of Turkish minority for presumably easier oversight.
The final result is their shattered identity and array of options presented to Pomaks to
choose from. It is very interesting that this constant switching of identities in Bulgaria is
different, between Bulgarians, Turks, Roma, and Pomaks whereas in Greece, they are similarly
between Bulgarians, Turks, Muslim, and Pomak. It may be because there are some incentives in
Bulgaria to ethnically promote Pomaks to a majority among the Muslim minority, while in
Greece these attempts are not so evident.
Nevertheless, the members of the minority have the privilege to use parts of their
identities when the need arises, but this poses new problems like uncertainty and inconsistent
identity conviction. State policies are very influential factors; Bulgaria and Greece have been
trying to change and rewrite the identity of Pomaks so the people could express their cultural and
religious uniqueness to a lesser extent. Ironically, the Iron Curtain has switched to a translucent
valance, enabling Pomaks to officially participate in activities, but on the other side, preventing
them to approach the state without any impediments.
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